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MOTION PICTURE PIRACY IN CHINA: 
RATED ARRRGH! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
nce viewed by many cultures as the sincerest form of flattery, 
copying is now universally considered an unforgivable crime.1 In 
fact, copyright theft has become “the largest irritant in the [multi-billion 
dollar] annual commercial relationship between the United States and 
China,”2 accounting for a loss of nearly $250 million in revenue in the 
United States each year. Blame it on Confucius.3 Blame it on poverty.4 
Blame it on ignorance.5 Blame it on a weak police force.6 No matter how 
you spin it, the excuses boil down to the same basic tenet: copyright in-
fringement is a serious problem in China and it is having an even more 
                                                                                                             
 1. See K.C. Swanson, The China Challenge, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 12, 2005. 
 2. US Disputes China’s Anti-Piracy Success, TAIPEI TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 11. 
 3. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China 
in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 165 (2000); K.C. Swanson, supra 
note 1 (explaining that in Chinese history, copying had a positive connotation, especially 
in the arts, and under Communism people were taught to share their resources). See also 
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 29 (1995) (explaining that in ancient Chinese 
civilization, copying was indicative of one’s appreciation for the work of a particular 
author; copying “bore witness to the quality of the work copied and to its creator’s degree 
of understanding and civility.”). 
 4. Eunice Yoon, U.S. Shoemaker Faces Chinese ‘Gall Factor,’ CNN.COM, May 19, 
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/19/eyeonchina.fakes/index.html 
(“The [Chinese] government is hamstrung by its desire to keep its 1.3 billion people em-
ployed to maintain social order,” explained Harley Lewin, a New York intellectual prop-
erty lawyer representing New Balance in a lawsuit.). 
 5. See Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
1998, at D1 (discussing that Chinese storeowners and consumers often do not realize the 
implication that piracy is criminal. One storeowner defended herself saying, “There’s 
nothing wrong with selling pirated VCD’s. My son loves watching them.”). 
 6. William Pesek, Jr., Chinese Counterfeiting Hurts China, Too, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., May 17, 2005 (explaining that local authorities often protect counterfeiters because 
they provide local jobs and that police are neither effective nor do they have budgets to 
enforce the law). See also Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm., (2005) (statement of Eric H. Smith, Presi-
dent, Int’l Intell. Prop. Alliance (IIPA)) (explaining that “unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the problem [of piracy] has less to do with inadequate laws and more with the ineffective 
and non-deterrent enforcement systems”); Kathleen E. McLaughlin & Christopher S. 
Rugaber, U.S., Chinese Trade Officials Make Progress on IPR, Market Access, but Stall 
on Textiles, Int’l Trade Rep., July 14, 2005, at 1162; Neil Graham, Senate Panel High-
lights Scourge of IP Piracy in Russia and China, Int’l Trade Rep., June 9, 2005, at 936; 
IIPA, 2005 Special 301 Report: People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2005), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/2005SPEC301PRCrev.pdf [hereinafter Special 301 Re-
port]. 
O 
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serious impact on American industries, particularly the motion picture 
industry. In fact, the motion picture industry faces a 95 percent piracy 
rate in China each year, which means that 95 percent of all American 
home videos and films7 sold in China are illegal copies.8 
The Chinese economy, in turn, has become dependent upon revenues 
from piracy, thus fueling its popularity.9 Some estimates attribute about 
one-third of China’s GDP to piracy and counterfeiting.10 The profits are 
so great that many pirates, akin to drug dealers,11 will take huge risks to 
attain them and do not see anything wrong with their acts.12 And while 
                                                                                                             
 7. See, e.g., PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt 
Disney Productions 2003); PETER PAN (Walt Disney Productions 1953); HOOK (Colum-
bia Pictures 1991); TREASURE ISLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1950); THE GOONIES 
(Warner Brothers 1985). 
 8. See Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intell. 
Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm., (2005) (statement of Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA) (ex-
plaining that between 1998 and 2004 the legitimate home video market in China repre-
sented about 5 percent of the estimated total $1.3 billion market); Economic Worth of the 
Copyright Industries: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 
4 (2004) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Pictures Association of 
America (MPAA)), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/Valenti 
Testimony040609.pdf. 
 9. Henry Blodget, How to Solve China’s Piracy Problem: A Dozen Ideas, Maybe 
One Will Work, SLATE, Apr. 12, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2116629/index.html. 
 10. Id. Not only do DVDs fall victim to counterfeiting in China, but products from 
virtually every other sector are also counterfeited, from Ralph Lauren shirts to Callaway 
golf clubs to Gucci handbags to Chevy cars. Malini Bawa, Pirating of Intellectual Prop-
erty by Chinese Businesses is Huge Problem, VOANEWS.COM, Nov. 22, 2005, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-11-22-voa61.cfm; China Pirates Conjure Fake 
Potter, CNN.COM, Jul. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/07/31/china. 
potter/ap/index.html. 
 11. Seth Faison, supra note 5, at D1. In his article, Faison compares pirates to drug 
dealers and explains that: 
[P]rofits are so great, [pirates] will take any risk . . . they’re like drug dealers. It 
is very difficult to arrange a crackdown. You have to coordinate all these dif-
ferent departments, the copyright publication department, the Industrial and 
Commercial Administration . . . . When it comes to copying a disk, most Chi-
nese people don’t see what’s wrong. 
Id. See also Greg Hernandez, China Piracy Costs High; Movies: Counterfeit DVD Sales 
Stealing Millions from Studios, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Nov. 22, 2005, at A21 
(citing an MPAA study claiming that revenue from piracy reached $512 billion in 2004, 
compared with $322 billion from the sale of illegal drugs); Greg Hernandez, It’s Even 
Bigger than Drugs: CD, DVD Piracy Makes Billions in China, DAILY NEWS OF LOS 
ANGELES, Nov. 22, 2005, at B1 (charging the profit margin for DVD piracy is “exponen-
tially higher” than for drugs). 
 12. Simon Teng, China’s IP Law Report Card: A Troubled Student?, IPFRONTLINE, 
Feb. 15, 2005, http://ipfrontline.com/printtemplate.asp?id=2131 (explaining that the 
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the Chinese government does not encourage piracy, current policy—such 
as the over-restrictive censure of releases13—and weak law enforcement 
do nothing to discourage it.14 
But piracy’s boon to the Chinese economy is a threat to the United 
States’ economy—or at least to certain sectors of the economy. Notwith-
standing the extraordinary rate of piracy in China, Jack Valenti, president 
of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), boasts the 
United States copyright industries as “America’s greatest trade prize”—
they represent the only sectors to maintain a surplus balance of trade with 
every other country in the world.15 The copyright industries—which in-
clude motion pictures, music, and books—are intertwined with other as-
pects of the economy, so their losses16 trickle down into the entirety of 
                                                                                                             
choice to become a pirate is often a “survival decision” due to rampant unemployment 
and the scarce number of jobs with livable wages available in China). 
 13. Official Chinese movie theaters are only permitted to show “clean” movies—
meaning those that have been screened by and approved by the Chinese government. 
Further, the government imposes strict limits on the number of foreign films that can be 
exhibited in China’s theaters and requires that it be on a revenue-sharing basis. The re-
sulting discrepancy between what the people want to see and what the government allows 
them to see has created a highly-trafficked black market for pirated goods. Yingchi Chu, 
The Consumption of Cinema in Contemporary China, in MEDIA IN CHINA: CONSUMPTION, 
CONTENT, AND CRISIS 43, 53 (Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, Michael Keane, & Yin Hong 
eds., 2002); Laikwan Pang, The global-national position of Hong Kong Cinema in China, 
in MEDIA IN CHINA: CONSUMPTION, CONTENT AND CRISIS, supra, at 59; Greg Hernandez, 
U.S. Studios Urge Crackdown on China’s CD, DVD Pirates, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Nov. 
24, 2005, at 23. 
 14. See Kathleen E. McLaughlin & Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S., Chinese Trade 
Officials Make Progress on IPR, Market Access, but Stall on Textiles, Int’l Trade Rep., 
July 14, 2005, at 1162; Greg Hernandez, supra note 13, at 23. Piracy has become such a 
competitive market that it has been reported that “Chinese storekeepers who sell fake 
DVDs for ten yuan gripe about street vendors selling them for seven. And the street ven-
dors complain about competitors offering two-for-one specials.” Blodget, supra note 9. 
 15. Alan Story, Don’t Ignore Copyright, the ‘Sleeping Giant’ on the TRIPS and In-
ternational Educational Agenda, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 125, 129 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 
2002). 
 16. “Losses” per se are very hard to calculate. The people who buy pirated DVDs in 
China often do so because they cannot afford to buy genuine products at full price. While 
the industry cites that it has lost roughly $280 million per year (compared to the esti-
mated $60 billion losses estimated to all other industries) the industry is not necessarily 
losing out on sales to the pirates. See Special 301 Report, supra note 6; James M. Sellers, 
The Black Market and Intellectual Property: A Potential Sherman Act Section Two Anti-
trust Defense?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 583, 605 (2004); Jon Healey & Chuck Philips, 
Piracy Spins a Global Web, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005. Andrew Mertha explains in his 
book, that the real uneasiness in Hollywood in relation to piracy, is a result of the unset-
tling notion of “free riding,” whereby “pirates reap profits from manufacturing—and 
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the United States’ economy, affecting job availability,17 tax flow, quality 
of life for various other businesses, and cash flow for investments.18 
These annual revenue losses have the copyright industries so riled up that 
they are lobbying for the World Trade Organization (WTO) to take ac-
tion against China.19 
In reality the WTO, by way of its Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is the kindling fueling many of the 
movie industry’s problems. The Agreement suffers from a lack of effec-
tive enforcement mechanisms and is thereby incapable of providing effi-
cient criminal remedies for the acts of movie pirates. Parts II and III of 
this Note examine the flaws inherent in the TRIPS Agreement, focusing 
on China’s criminal code and motion picture piracy as illustrations of 
where the Agreement went wrong. Part IV suggests that the WTO reini-
tiate negotiations to amend TRIPS in order to better protect intellectual 
property rights; and Part V concludes that the piracy problem is not 
likely to be resolved without any WTO intervention, as illustrated by the 
drastic measures being taken in self-defense by Hollywood and the 
United States’ government. 
II. THE TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AGREEMENT 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights20 requires member nations21 to uphold Intellectual Property Rights 
                                                                                                             
consumers enjoy the savings from purchasing—pirated goods that deny the rightholders 
their share of remuneration.” ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 19 (Cornell Univ. Press 2005). 
 17. James M. Sellers, supra note 16, at 605–06 (discussing that the Business Software 
Alliance estimated a loss of 44,000 jobs lost directly, and 74,000 jobs through a trickle-
down effect in 2001, plus a loss of $22 billion in 2001). See also John Malcolm & Lauren 
Nguyen, Criminal Prosecution Needed in Movie Piracy Cases, PROSECUTOR, July/Aug. 
2005, at 37 (explaining that copyright theft is not a victimless crime because it affects not 
only producers but also carpenters, seamstresses, electricians, and other personnel). 
 18. Malcolm & Nguyen, supra note 17, at 37. 
 19. Swanson, supra note 1. See infra Part IV (discussing the counter-arguments that 
WTO action may not be the right technique to solve the piracy problem). 
 20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. TRIPS was 
the result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, which took place at 
Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986 to negotiate fourteen different trade-related 
topics including intellectual property. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 10−12 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 2003) (1998). 
 21. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, at Annex 12 (listing the WTO Members as of 
January 1, 2002), reprinted in GERVAIS, supra note 20. 
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(IPR) and enforce their nation’s civil and criminal laws governing IPR.22 
In general, the TRIPS Agreement sets out minimum standards for IPR 
protection,23 basic principles of enforcement,24 and means for dispute 
settlement through the WTO that each member country must abide.25 
Initially entered into force in January 1996 as a compilation of and addi-
tion to the Berne and Paris Conventions,26 the TRIPS Agreement was 
referred to as an intellectual property milestone because it was the first 
agreement to create detailed rules, in the form of universal minimum 
standards, in the area of IPR enforcement.27 Idealists who look to the 
                                                                                                             
 22. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 11 
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). 
 23. The importance of the agreement is that it:  
[S]ets these standards by requiring, first, that the substantive obligations of the 
main conventions of the WIPO, the Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)  in their most recent 
versions, must be complied with . . . . Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement adds a 
substantial number of additional obligations on matters where the pre-existing 
conventions are silent or were seen as being inadequate. The TRIPS Agreement 
is thus sometimes referred to as a Berne and Paris-plus Agreement. 
WTO Intellectual Property—Overview of TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005) 
[hereinafter Overview of TRIPS]. 
 24. Id. (“[E]nforcement contains provisions on civil and administrative procedures 
and remedies, provisional measures, special requirements related to border measures and 
criminal procedures which specify, in a certain amount of detail, the procedures and 
remedies that must be available so that right holders can effectively enforce their 
rights.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 
(1986). Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at the 
Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 303. 
 27. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 3. In his book, Gervais writes: 
[The scope of TRIPS] is in fact much broader than that of any previous interna-
tional agreement, covering not only all areas already (sometimes only partly) 
protected under extant agreements, but also giving new life to treaties that 
failed and protecting for the first time rights that did not benefit form any multi-
lateral protection. In addition, and some would say perhaps more importantly 
than its broad coverage, the TRIPS Agreement enshrined detailed rules on one 
of the most difficult and, for rights holders, painful aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights: enforcement. 
See also Maria Strong, Copyright Enforcement: Basic Considerations and Strategies to 
Protect Copyrights Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS: 
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WTO to solve the global problem of IPR violations view TRIPS as  
“not only a trade agreement, [but] also a multifaceted project to export to 
all corners of the globe a particular set of values and presumptions about 
the need to protect both ideas and the expression of those ideas . . . .”28 It 
follows that the TRIPS Agreement was drafted to effectively protect IPR 
while encouraging international trade, not burdening it.29 
TRIPS endeavors to achieve these results through two basic principles: 
national treatment and most favored nation status. National treatment 
requires that members treat their own citizens the same as citizens of 
other Member States with respect to IPR enforcement, while most fa-
vored nation status provides equal treatment under domestic laws, pre-
venting one member country from getting a ‘better deal’ on IPR than 
another or one Member State from receiving unfair advantages over an-
other.30 
Members to the TRIPS Agreement are required to implement criminal 
sanctions for “willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy31 car-
ried out on a commercial scale.”32 In other words, TRIPS seeks to punish 
                                                                                                             
ENFORCEMENT AND MANAGEMENT 61, 64 (John T. Masterson ed., 2004) (explaining that 
the Agreement is often referred to as “Berne-plus” which indicates that TRIPS raised the 
minimum standards set in the Berne Agreement). 
 28. Story, supra note 15, at 129. See also Understanding the WTO—Intellectual 
Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (explaining that TRIPS is an attempt to unify IPR protection while 
simultaneously striking a balance between the long-term benefits of creation and inven-
tion with the short-term costs of protection mechanisms to society). 
 29. Overview of TRIPS, supra note 23. 
 30. See John T. Masterson, Jr., Enforcement of Trademarks and Copyrights under the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS: ENFORCEMENT AND MANAGEMENT, su-
pra note 27, at 2–3; J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 21, 25 (Carlos M. Correa 
& Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). 
 31. International Chamber of Commerce Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, En-
forcement Measures Against Counterfeiting and Piracy: An International Survey, at x 
n.21 [hereinafter Survey]. This survey indicates that the TRIPS Agreement defines pi-
rated copyright goods as: 
[A]ny goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder or 
person duly authorized by him in the country of production and which are made 
directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have 
constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the 
country of importation. 
 32. Id. at xv. The TRIPS Agreement also creates civil and administrative policies and 
laws relating to IPR; the focus of this Note is the criminal aspect of TRIPS. 
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and deter people profiting from the business of piracy.33 Under Article 
61(1) of TRIPS, the punishments imposed by a Member State against a 
copyright violator34 must be comparable to the penalties for similar 
crimes under the national law of the WTO member concerned and must 
respect Article 41(1) of TRIPS,35 which obliges Member States to put 
forth their best efforts to prevent infringement and to provide expeditious 
remedies to prevent and deter future infringements.36 
Actual enforcement of IPR in Member States in order to inflict these 
penalties upon pirates, however, is difficult to achieve. Although WTO 
members are required to enact statutes that conform to TRIPS, the 
Agreement does not include specific mechanisms or detailed rules gov-
erning the application of such provisions. Further, TRIPS requires sanc-
tions relative to those for other similar crimes—a rather undefined stan-
dard—which yields inconsistent results among the member nations. Arti-
cle 41(5) plainly states that “nothing in this Part creates any obligation 
with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of 
[IPR] and the enforcement of law in general.”37 The Article elaborates 
that members need not implement a separate judicial system to enforce 
IPR.38 As a result, a member nation can easily skimp out on providing 
maximum enforcement of their IPR laws by claiming it does not have 
enough resources to do the job.39 As a WTO Agreement, disputes arising 
under TRIPS may be resolved through WTO procedures40 such as a dis-
pute settlement panel, review by the Appellate Body, or cross-retaliation 
                                                                                                             
 33. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20. 
 34. Id. art. 61 (explaining that the TRIPS Agreement not only covers issues relating to 
copyright rights. The TRIPS Agreement covers the areas of intellectual property includ-
ing copyright and related rights, trademarks including service marks, geographical indica-
tions including applications of origin; industrial designs; patents, including the protection 
of new varieties of plants; the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed in-
formation including trade secrets and test data). 
 35. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 327. See also Overview of TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 23 (noting that enforcement must be in accordance with particular rules. Govern-
ments must ensure that IPR can be enforced under their laws and that the penalties for 
infringement are tough enough to deter further violations. The procedures must be fair 
and equitable, but at the same time they may not be unnecessarily complicated or costly. 
For example, they must not include unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays.). 
 36. Masterson, supra note 30, at 8–9. 
 37. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41(5). 
 38. Id. art. 41(5). 
 39. See infra Part III (explaining the impact this has on China and, analogously, other 
developing countries). 
 40. See Masterson, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that this is governed by Article 22 
of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes). 
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by Member States,41 these procedures are rarely—if ever—used. As of 
2004, such WTO mechanisms had never been used to combat the inade-
quate enforcement of IPR.42 
Further complicating the implementation process is the caveat that the 
private parties, such as individual authors, artists, producers, or interest 
groups (e.g., the MPAA), who are most likely to see their rights directly 
violated and to feel the effects of an IPR violation, cannot enforce the 
TRIPS Agreement.43 Instead they must make complaints through gov-
ernment channels with access to settlement procedures.44 The United 
States, for example, provides such an option through section 301 of the 
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. This Act allows any in-
terested person to “file a petition with the United States Trade Represen-
tative (USTR) requesting it take action to enforce the United States’ 
rights under a trade agreement or to prevent unreasonable foreign trade 
practices.”45 Upon such a request, the USTR will investigate the allega-
tions made in the individual’s petition or explain the decision not to in-
vestigate.46 Then, the USTR may initiate WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings against a foreign country it has identified as having serious IPR 
deficiencies that warrant increased attention to particular problem areas 
or practices under the auspices of Special 301.47 Because such efforts are 
time consuming and onerous, they do not provide an effective tool for 
deterring piracy or punishing it. The United States has been particularly 
wary about pursuing WTO procedures against China for fear of straining 
the relationship between the two countries.48 Specifically, China and the 
United States have an interdependent trading partnership whereby the 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 4 (explaining that Article 6 of TRIPS limits dispute settlement to concerning 
the “exhaustion of intellectual property rights” to violations of the national agreement and 
most favored nation obligations). 
 42. Masterson, supra note 30, at 6–7. 
 43. Only members to an agreement may enforce its provisions unless expressly pro-
vided for otherwise. In the case of the WTO, the only members are States, not individu-
als. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, passim. 
 44. Survey, supra note 31, at xvi. 
 45. Id. at xvii. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Masterson, supra note 30, at 18–20 (referencing section 182 of the Trade Act of 
1974, under which the USTR may identify countries that deny adequate protection of IPR 
or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons that rely upon IP protection. It is 
under Special 301, however, that the USTR has power to designate countries to the Prior-
ity Watch List.); Yu, supra note 3, at 128–29 (referring to the Special 301 as the “H-
bomb of trade policy” because it is a dramatic measure aiming to completely eliminate 
unfair trade practices, while allowing the United States to impose sanctions upon coun-
tries it finds threatening to its economic progress). 
 48. See Yu, supra note 3. 
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United States absorbs nearly a third of China’s exports and China is the 
fifth largest market for U.S. exports.49 Similarly, the United States de-
pends upon Chinese cooperation to peacefully resolve potential tensions 
involving Taiwan, Hong Kong, and North Korea.50 
Ultimately, as evidenced by the sky-high rate of copyright infringe-
ment around the world, sufficient enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement 
is sorely lacking.51 No matter how closely a country aligns its own laws 
with the standards of the TRIPS Agreement, the rate of piracy and re-
spect for IPR will be difficult to improve without significant changes to 
the Agreement itself.52 
III. CASE STUDY: CHINA 
Russia and China are the biggest thieving countries. If they wanted to 
take care of their IP problems, they could. They don’t belong in the 
WTO unless they do. Hopefully, they’re watching, because we mean 
business. 
Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property of the Senate Judiciary Committee53 
There is a tendency to build unrealistic expectations regarding China’s 
ability to enforce policy. In particular, there is a propensity to oversim-
plify the issue and place the blame for failure squarely at the feet of 
China’s national leadership. 
Andrew Mertha, author of The Politics of Piracy54 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Id.  
 50. Id. at 17; Swanson, supra note 1. 
 51. Masterson, supra note 30, at 6. Motion picture piracy rates are high in countries 
around the globe, not just in China. See, e.g., Myron Brilliant, Vice President, East Asia, 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Views on China’s Intellectual Property Record, Testimony 
Before the House Judicial Subcommittee on the Internet and Intellectual Property (May 
17, 2005), available at  http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/ehmj5rnmn43vyr73f 
e5rdh6xpyowlsuk6ochwrqheq65rtcttlsxeovg4rdxytjcgjzbxv23df2uo44tcwhl7jhxhrd/Hous
eJudiciaryChinatestimonyMay172005revised.doc (the rate in Russia is 80 percent); Caro-
lyn Boyle, View From Here: Copyright Clampdown, LEGAL WEEK GLOBAL, Nov. 24, 
2005 (the rate in Malaysia is over 90 percent). 
 52. Although TRIPS was drafted to reflect the United States’ laws regarding IPR, 
piracy is still rampant in this country. For example, on Manhattan’s Canal Street, police 
frequently overlook the sale of imitation goods which abundantly impale the market. 
MERTHA, supra note 16, at 37–52; Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflec-
tions on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1381, 1381 (2005). 
 53. Graham, supra note 6, at 936. 
 54. Mertha, supra note 16, at 225. 
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A. China’s Piracy Problem 
Consider a country where Spader-Man (not Spider Man)55 protects the 
streets from danger, workout enthusiasts don New Barlun sneakers (as 
opposed to New Balance),56 and movie buffs see films months before 
their scheduled release,57 and one would not be surprised to learn that 
China, one of the largest infringers of copyright rights in the world,58 has 
long been the target of pressure from both the United States and the 
World Trade Organization to tighten its protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights.59 
However, China is also a country where criminal laws penalizing copy-
right infringement have been on the books since the early 1990s, a spe-
cialized court to prosecute IPR infringement was set up in 1996,60 and a 
number of bureaucratic agencies were established to implement the 
country’s copyright laws.61 The disparity between the expected result of 
China’s bold efforts to protect IPR and the reality of rampant piracy 
evokes many questions concerning the effectiveness of Chinese policy, 
the seriousness of enforcers, and the root of the problem with Chinese 
regulations. 
B. China’s Criminal Law Pertaining to Copyright Infringement 
For the first time in its millennia-long history, China amended its 
criminal law in 1990 to include a provision subjecting serious offenders 
of copyright to criminal sanctions such as fines and product confisca-
                                                                                                             
 55. Andrew Frew McMillan, ‘Spader-man’ Prowls Hong Kong’s Streets, CNN.COM, 
May 16, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/05/15/hk.spaderman/ 
index.html. 
 56. Yoon, supra note 4. 
 57. Swanson, supra note 1. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. See also ANDREW C. MERTHA, supra note 16, at 37–52 (explaining the long-
term negotiations between the United States and China regarding IPR). 
 60. Jiang Zhipei, Member, Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Address at the 
Int’l Intell. Prop. Inst. Seminar: Recent Developments in China’s Judicial Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/ 
English/forum/forum33.htm [hereinafter Jiang Zhipei Address]. 
 61. MERTHA, supra note 16, at 133–35 (citing examples of bureaucratic agencies 
created to fight piracy, including: the Ministry of Culture Publications Bureau—
originally the Central People’s Government Publishing General Administration—the 
National Copyright Administration of the Ministry of Culture, National Publications 
Enterprises Management Bureau, National Press and Publications General Administra-
tion, and local Copyright Divisions). 
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tion.62 Although China was not yet a member of the WTO, it drafted 
these criminal laws to conform to the TRIPS requirements.63 While it is 
debatable whether this change was made to placate foreign powers fix-
ated on reforming China’s disposition as a threat to copyright holders or 
because it hoped to eventually enter into the WTO is debatable, the ges-
ture nevertheless signaled China’s willingness to take IPR seriously and 
to change policies that impliedly condoned piracy as a means of eco-
nomic advancement.64 
In its simplest terms, China’s criminal law punishes copyright in-
fringement, for example the reproduction or distribution of a motion pic-
ture without the permission of the copyright owner, for the purpose of 
making a profit. Where the amount of illegal gains from such infringe-
ment is “huge” or there are “situations of serious circumstances,” the 
individual infringer is subject to a fixed term of imprisonment of up to 
three years and a potential fine.65 However, if the amount of illegal gains 
from such infringement is “relatively large” or there are “especially seri-
ous circumstances,” the individual infringer is subject to a fixed term of 
                                                                                                             
 62. PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 140 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 
2003) (explaining that it took until 1990 for China to amend its criminal law because of 
the traditional view in China that intangible property—like a copyright—was not as valu-
able as tangible property. The author further describes the process by which major laws 
are issued by the National People’s Congress (NPC), the supreme legislative body in 
China. The NPC is made up of three administrative organs: the State Council, the Su-
preme People’s Procuratorate, and the Supreme People’s Court, and each of these admin-
istrative organs may issue binding administrative orders, such as a judicial interpretation 
of a law). 
 63. See Embassy of the United States, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/ 
copyright.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). China first began its “negotiations” over IPR 
with the United States in 1979. The new criminal provisions were most likely added in 
response to mounting pressure by the USTR, as well as China’s co-signatories of the 
Paris Convention on International Trade, who had already become infuriated by China’s 
utter disregard for IPR. Andrew Mertha explains further that the United States used the 
draft TRIPS Agreement:  
[A]s a “carrot” . . . to get China to agree to better protection of U.S. copyright 
in China: if China made sufficient progress, according to one US negotiator, the 
United States would support China’s bid to be a founding member of the 
[WTO]. Thus TRIPS provided a convenient substantive and symbolic link be-
tween U.S. IPR concerns and China’s desire to join the WTO.   
MERTHA, supra note 16, at 127. 
 64. Id. at 37–52. See also RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND 
LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 6–7 (Kluwer Law Int’l 1997). 
 65. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, 
amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) (P.R.C.). 
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imprisonment ranging from three to seven years and/or a potential fine.66 
Further, a penalty of up to four years of imprisonment can be mandated 
for a person who, for the purpose of making a profit, knowingly sells 
motion pictures or video recordings reproduced by infringing upon the 
owner’s copyright.67 When one of the above referenced crimes is com-
mitted by a unit—rather than an individual—the Code provides that the 
unit be punished “in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate 
article.”68 
Drafted in a somewhat ambiguous and illogical fashion, the provisions’ 
key terms—for example, “huge” and “relatively large” illegal gains, the 
corresponding fines for such gains, and the term “knowingly”—are not 
defined. Explanations of these terms were later specified by the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC)69 in the form of judicial interpretations70 of the 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. art 217. Article 217 of the Criminal Law states, in part: 
Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, commits any of the following acts 
of infringement on copyright shall, if the amount of illegal gains is relatively 
large, or if there are other serious circumstances, be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, 
or shall only, be fined; if the amount of illegal gains is huge or if there are other 
especially serious circumstances, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term impris-
onment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also 
be fined: (1) reproducing and distributing a . . . motion picture . . . without per-
mission of the copyright owner; . . . (3) reproducing and distributing an audio 
or video recording produced by another person without permission of the pro-
ducer. 
Id. Although these are not the only actions that are criminalized, motion pictures are the 
relevant medium that will be described for the purpose of this Note. 
 67. Id. art. 218. Article 218 of the Criminal Law states, in its entirety: 
Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, knowingly sells works reproduced 
by infringing on the copyright of the owners as mentioned in Article 217 of this 
Law shall, if the amount of illegal gains is huge, be sentenced to a fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, 
or shall only, be fined. 
Id. 
 68. Id. art. 220. Article 220 of the Criminal Law states, in its entirety: 
Where a unit commits any of the crimes mentioned in the Articles from 213 
through 219 of this Section, it shall be fined, and the persons who are directly 
in charge and the other persons who are directly responsible for the crime shall 
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Articles respectively. 
Id. 
 69. BROWN, supra note 64, at 35–37 (discussing that the SPC is an independent judi-
cial authority that does not receive any interference from administrative institutions, indi-
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law, issued first in April 2001 and most recently in December 2004.71 
SPC-issued interpretive administrative orders function in Chinese law 
like legislation.72 
The SPC’s 2001 judicial interpretation of the criminal law defined the 
thresholds for a punishable copyright crime at a virtually unattainable 
level and penalized infringers with minimal fines.73 That infringers were 
undeterred from their acts is an understatement—enforcement remained 
severely deficient. Days after an infringing factory was fined and shut 
down it would reopen.74 Weeks after a raid confiscating hundreds of 
DVDs, perpetrators would pop-up at a different store in Beijing.75 And in 
2003 only three cases were filed under criminal provisions (as compared 
to a mere nineteen criminal cases in 2002, which resulted in sentences 
ranging from six months to six years imprisonment).76 Not surprisingly, 
China is routinely cited on the USTR Priority Watch List77 and on the 
radar of other concerned countries that anticipated sustained detriments 
to their own copyright industries. 
China’s attempt to better protect copyright—and thwart retaliation by 
its trading partners—culminated in its enactment in December 2004 of a 
new judicial interpretation (JI) of the criminal law pertaining to IPR in-
                                                                                                             
viduals, or public organizations; it is responsible for administrating courts, interpreting 
the laws, adjudicating cases, and participating in lawmaking). 
 70. A judicial interpretation is an interpretation of the law issued by a judicial organ 
and viewed by government and Party officials to have the same bearing as a traditional 
administrative order. Id. at 37 n.167. 
 71. Criminal codes are enforced in dual part by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
(SPP), which heads the prosecution system and has the ability to initiate criminal cases 
under the Law of Criminal Procedure, and the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), an inde-
pendent judicial authority that issues judicial interpretations of the law. Id. at 8–10, 25–
27. 
 72. Id. at 67–68 (explaining that SPC orders are the function of a judicial organ of the 
NPC. The NPC is made up of three bodies including the SPP and the SPC.). 
 73. Special 301 Report, supra note 6. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.; [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate on Several Issues of Application of Laws When Hearing the Criminal 
Cases of Infringing on the Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by the Sup. Peo-
ple’s Ct. and the Sup. People’s Proc., Dec. 21, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004), arts. 5–6, 
14, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Judicial 
Interpretation]. 
 77. Yu, supra note 3, at 131–39 (explaining the cycle where the United States would 
put China on its “watch-list,” make threats of sanctions to bully it into making laws that 
would change its IPR, ultimately do nothing, and then put China on the priority list 
again). 
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fringement.78 The new JI redefines its key terms to more adequately meet 
the demands both of the WTO—particularly Articles 41 and 61 of 
TRIPS—and of “offended” countries.79 
Ostensibly, the 2004 JI would make it easier for China to prosecute 
copyright infringers by lowering monetary thresholds and recalculating 
the value of illegal gains necessary to trigger pirate prosecution.80 Spe-
cifically, the JI redefines “relatively large illegal gains” as a profit greater 
than RMB 30,000 (US$3,710) and “huge illegal gains” as a profit more 
than RMB 150,000 (US$18,552).81 The value gained is calculated based 
upon the selling price, not on the price of real goods for the products.82 
Similarly, the JI lowers the volume of infringing products that a pirate 
may sell before he is subject to prosecution.83 It is considered a “serious 
circumstance” when an individual reproduces and distributes at least 
1,000 illegal copies of a motion picture without the permission of the 
copyright owner and an “especially serious circumstance” where an indi-
vidual reproduces and distributes at least 5,000 copies of the motion pic-
ture.84 Other “serious circumstances” include instances where the illegal 
business volume exceeds RMB 50,000 (US$6,326) and other “especially 
serious circumstances” include where the illegal business volume ex-
ceeds RMB 250,000 (US$31,632).85 Perhaps one of the most significant 
changes in the JI is the alteration of the rules pertaining to “units” com-
mitting a crime. The JI elevates the punishment level for units to a rate of 
three times that prescribed for an individual pirate, compared to the pre-
vious JI which assigned trivial punishments for group actions.86 
C. China’s Compliance with TRIPS 
The USTR and IIPA are famous for issuing reports that insist that if 
only China would change its laws or if only China would follow the 
TRIPS agreement, piracy would be eradicated—or at least greatly dimin-
                                                                                                             
 78. Judicial Interpretation, supra note 76. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Currency conversion computations made using The Universal Currency Con-
verter, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). For the text of the 
Judicial Interpretation, see Judicial Interpretation, supra note 76, arts. 5–6, 14. 
 82. Wu Jing, China Lowers the Conviction Criteria of IPR Violation, People’s Daily 
Online (P.R.C.), Dec. 23, 2004, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200412/23/ 
eng20041223_168430.html. 
 83. Judicial Interpretation, supra note 76. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. arts. 5–6. 
 86. Id. art. 15. See China Pirates Conjure Fake Potter, supra note 10. 
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ished—in that country.87 This section will demonstrate that the new JI is 
even more closely aligned with the major standards regarding copyright 
infringement set out in Articles 41 and 61 of TRIPS than its predeces-
sors. Yet, since the adoption of the JI, the rate of copyright infringement 
in China has neither seen the radical decrease once predicted,88 nor is one 
anticipated.89 This section will then demonstrate why apparent ambigui-
ties and weaknesses inherent throughout the TRIPS Agreement are to 
blame for this failure. 
Under Article 41(1) of TRIPS, Member States are required to incorpo-
rate enforcement procedures that “permit effective action against any act 
of infringement of intellectual property right covered by [the TRIPS] 
agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements”90 into 
their laws. In other words, each Member must allow its courts to “issue 
injunctions, award compensatory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, 
allow the recovery of profits; and order the uncompensated seizure and 
disposition of infringing goods.”91 
An examination of China’s current policies shows that the country has 
implemented measures to comply with these requirements. In 1996 a 
new court was established expressly to hear IP cases.92 In 2004, as a re-
sult of 573 raids, 145 shops selling pirated DVDs were closed and 510 
were fined.93 Also in 2004, over 22 million DVDs were seized, 34 cases 
were commenced, 30 indictments were made, and 21 cases resulted in 
                                                                                                             
 87. Special 301 Report, supra note 6. See also Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hear-
ing Before the Subcommittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm. (2005) (statement of 
Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA) (explaining that the IIPA submits annual reports to the 
USTR on the piracy of sixty-seven countries, including China, and detailing some of the 
reasons for piracy’s breadth); International Intellectual Property Alliance: About IIPA, 
http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 88. Various IIPA and USTR documents and reviews of China audaciously proclaim 
that if China would accede to the TRIPS agreement and follow it more closely all would 
be solved with the problem of piracy, but this Note’s analysis indicates that may not be 
so. International Intellectual Property Alliance: About IIPA, supra note 87; OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REP., OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW ON CHINA, (2005), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_
301/asset_upload_file835_7647.pdf [hereinafter USTR Out-of-Cycle Review]. 
 89. See Chris Buckley, On Piracy, An Advocate for China’s Progress, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Oct. 4, 2005. 
 90. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41(1). 
 91. Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on 
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L. L. 441, 461 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 92. Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60. 
 93. Special 301 Report, supra note 6, at 196. 
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jail time.94 Despite these successes, the IIPA placed China on its Priority 
Watch List and charged that China has not met its TRIPS commitment to 
provide effective criminal enforcement against piracy and is at fault for 
not exhibiting the “political will” needed to bring about such changes.95 
It is true that China has not yet efficiently and effectively refined its 
mechanisms for preventing and punishing piracy. However, this is not 
inconceivable considering that the ambiguities and loopholes encom-
passed by Article 41(5) suggest that the objectives set out in Article 
41(1) need not be enforced in their entirety.96 The effect, in whole, is that 
the potential benefits of “international IPR enforcement cannot be real-
ized on a global scale.”97 Article 41(5) enunciates that it does not create 
any obligations on Member States to implement a new judicial system 
for the enforcement of IPR nor does it oblige Members to expend extra 
resources on IPR enforcement.98 Thus, developing countries whose legal 
systems are not adapted to such regulations are weak protectors of IPR. 
For example, the judicial system China implemented for IP cases is not 
yet very effective.99 Because Article 41(5) does not create any obliga-
tions with respect to the distribution of resources, China is not required 
to put forth more resources toward IPR than it does to the enforcement of 
law in general.100 As a result, China may uphold its existing law en-
forcement mechanisms, no matter how inadequate they are. Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at 200. This data was estimated by the IIPA; China has not officially released 
its own data in this matter. The Bush administration, along with Japan and Switzerland, 
has demanded that China share information regarding the enforcement of IPR by January 
23, 2006. Edward Alden, U.S. to Press China on Moves Against Piracy, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at 11. 
 95. Special 301 Report, supra note 6; USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88. 
 96. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 327; Jishnu Guha, Time for India’s Intellectual Prop-
erty Regime to Grow Up, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 225, 237 (2005). 
 97. Jishnu Guha, supra note 96, at 253. 
 98. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41(5). 
 99. See Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60. 
 100. Christian L. Broadbent & Amanda M. McMillian, Russia and the World Trade 
Organization: Will TRIPS be a Stumbling Block to Accession?, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. 
L. 519, 546 (1998). This article narrowly interprets TRIPS Article 41(5) to mean that: 
Members are not required to put in place a system of judicial enforcement en-
tirely distinct from that State’s already existing court system. However, the 
language that emphasizes a Member State’s autonomy in distributing resources 
between intellectual property enforcement and general enforcement may have a  
 
significant impact in countries like Russia where the government has limited 
resources to dedicate to enforcement of intellectual property laws. 
Id. 
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police force, stymied by bribery and inadequate training, is incapable of 
curbing piracy and would be even if China had the most sophisticated 
system of laws.101 
The USTR and IIPA fault China as having weak law enforcement 
mechanisms.102 They call on China to increase fines for IPR infringe-
ment. They promote the idea of transparency by requesting that China 
make public IPR-related case rulings and statistics.103 And they demand 
that China “[m]ake administrative IPR enforcement actions deterrent.”104 
However, these demands reach beyond the scope of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, no matter how helpful they would be to foreign nations. TRIPS 
does not require a country to make fundamental changes to its national 
legal system105—yet insisting that China make its case decisions public 
and change its enforcement actions would be such a fundamental change. 
Ironically, the drafters envisioned the ambiguous language in Article 
41 as a safety valve to ensure TRIPS was unanimously accepted by the 
Member States.106 The provisions allowed for broader interpretations, 
accounted for limited resources in developing countries, and avoided the 
requirement that each country develop a new judicial system.107 Instead, 
the ability to broadly interpret the agreement is easily exploited by mem-
ber nations eager to find any excuse not to fully enforce TRIPS. The ef-
fect is that in Member States, measures are implemented “only as far as 
normally available judicial or administrative resources are available.”108 
D. The Impact of TRIPS’ Inadequacies on China’s IPR Law and  
Enforcement 
Admittedly, the JI is not perfect. Current provisions that require a 
profit motive before criminalizing behavior and that provide weak pun-
ishments for accomplices must be amended in order for China to vigor-
                                                                                                             
 101. See e.g., Pesek, supra note 6. 
 102. USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88; Piracy of Intellectual Property: 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm. (2005) (state-
ment of Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA). 
 103. Id. The USTR report explains that China refuses to give information to foreign 
governments about the severity of punishments given to pirates or what happens to goods 
confiscated during raids. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Survey, supra note 31, at x–xi. 
 106. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 287 (explaining that Article 41(5) addresses the 
“stumbling blocks” of negotiation dealing with conflicting legal systems and differing 
levels of available resources among the countries). 
 107. Id. at 287–89.  
 108. Id. at 289. 
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ously target pirates.109 But analyzed objectively as a country whose legal 
system is still developing, Chinese laws reflect the requirements set out 
in TRIPS to a remarkable degree.110 Even the United States, in the 2005 
USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, acknowledged that, under the leadership of 
Vice Premier Wu Yi, China has made significant strides in the arena of 
protecting IPR.111 So, instead of faulting China’s legal system, interna-
tional focus should turn to the real reason China’s laws are not having 
the immediate impacts desired by the United States and other foreign 
countries: the inadequacies of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Despite China making changes to and enacting its own laws to meet 
the standards enunciated in TRIPS standards,112 the USTR has deter-
mined several years in a row that China has failed to adequately protect 
IPR. And in early 2005, China was officially placed on the USTR Prior-
ity Watch List because of universal concern that China is not in compli-
ance with its WTO/TRIPS obligations and is not actually on the road to 
adequately protect IPR.113 China’s failure to significantly reduce the in-
cidence of IPR violations is largely a consequence of the TRIPS Agree-
ment’s failure to address issues such as the provision of resources for 
enforcement and fundamental changes to national legal systems.114 And 
as a result, China’s Judicial Interpretation of its criminal laws regarding 
IPR, although created to comply with TRIPS, cannot adequately succeed 
in producing significant decreases in copyright infringement.115 
From the perspective of Chinese lawmakers, the enactment of a new JI 
regarding the criminalization of IPR infringement was a bold step in the 
                                                                                                             
 109. See id. 
 110. See infra note 61; MERTHA, supra note 16, passim. 
 111. USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88, at 1. 
 112. See infra Part III.C. 
 113. USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88 (explaining that once a country is 
placed on the Priority Watch List it is subject to a special yearly review. The 2005 review 
concluded that China has not done enough to curb piracy and must continue to change its 
practices of implementing its IPR laws.). 
 114. See Survey, supra note 31, at xi. 
 115. Teng, supra note 12 (reporting that the Special 301 Report Card found that, in 
2003, 85 percent of DVDs manufactured in China were pirated, as were 69 percent of 
VCDs. Further, it was reported that the Special 301 report estimated that in 2004 U.S. 
industries lost $2.5 billion to piracy in China. Overall piracy rates hover around 90 per-
cent in China.); FENG, supra note 62, at 140 (explaining that in the January 1995 Judicial 
Interpretation, criminal sanctions would be imposed for “illegal sales exceeding RMB 
100,000 for individuals and RMB 500,000 for units.”  Additionally, the 1995 interpreta-
tion considered factors such as a previous record of criminal copyright infringement or 
political and social consequences. The current interpretation does not take these factors 
into consideration.). 
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pursuit of judicial reform.116 In fact, in the self-proclaimed era of “Justice 
and Efficiency,”117 which seeks to provide “effective protection for the 
legal interests of IP rights holders, promot[e] the prosperity and devel-
opment of science, technology and culture, [help] to regulate the eco-
nomic order of the market and [improve] the investment environment,”118 
the JI would be the effort’s pinnacle.  
In theory, it is a bold step forward. For decades, outsiders perceived 
China as having a moral void in the realm of IPR.119 The JI, in contrast, 
serves as a guide to judges, a tool to educate the public, and a promise to 
the international community to provide more effective protection.120 But 
in practice, the mechanisms to enforce such a bold plan are limited. The 
country faces challenges more serious than IP and therefore cannot focus 
its monetary resources on the problem.121 Further, customs agents are 
easily bribed to allow pirates to import and export pirated goods.122 The 
police force, relied upon to implement and enforce the law, does not have 
enough money in its budget to enforce the law or to properly train its 
officers in regard to IPR.123 And combined with the drafters’ failure to 
maintain TRIPS as an agreement capable of placing adequate pressure on 
a country to strengthen its IPR enforcement—or their failure to foresee 
the necessity of doing this—the ultimate result is that China will con-
tinue to move at a slow, but steady pace toward its goal of curbing pi-
racy.124 
                                                                                                             
 116. See Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60. 
 117. Id. In his speech regarding recent developments in China’s judicial protection of 
IPR, Zhipei stated: 
Since China’s entry into WTO, reform in China has reached a new stage and 
the judicial reform of the Courts has been carried out even further. “Justice and 
Efficiency” has been declared the theme of the judicial system in the 21st cen-
tury and a well-focused movement to make Chinese judges more professional 
has been put on the schedule. All of these measures have created a sound situa-
tion at home and abroad for the Court to carry out the difficult mission of IP 
law enforcement in China. I am confident that IP law enforcement will become 
ever more just and efficient. 
Id. 
 118. Jiang Zhipei is a Member of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s 
Court and has been involved in the formulation of legislation of intellectual property law 
in China. Id. 
 119. See generally ALFORD, supra note 3. 
 120. Buckley, supra note 89. 
 121. Id.   
 122. Faison, supra note 5.  
 123. Pesek, supra note 6; Special 301 Report, supra note 6. 
 124. Buckley, supra note 89. 
224 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:1 
IV. SOLUTION: PUTTING THE WTO BACK ON TRACK 
And so, more than a decade after joining the WTO, piracy in China has 
not been significantly reduced. But the onus for change cannot be placed 
upon China—or comparable countries—alone. First, TRIPS does not 
provide mechanisms for harmonization,125 which means that every coun-
try can choose its own method to cope with piracy and its WTO respon-
sibilities. The result if every developing country did this, however, would 
be a jumble of rules and regulations. Second, China is doing all that it 
can—at this moment—to enforce IPR. As discussed in Part III, China 
has already developed a new court system and changed its laws to com-
ply with TRIPS.126 Further, China is working hard to educate government 
officials, as well as lawyers, businessmen, and trademark agents, about 
IP protection and laws at the Intellectual Property Training Center in 
Beijing which opened in January 1997.127 The onus, instead, must be 
placed on the WTO itself to stimulate change.128 
But the ideas of imposing sanctions or filing an official complaint at 
the WTO, which have been advocated—or at least threatened—by the 
MPAA, IIPA, and USTR, are not certain to be viable options either.129 
This form of WTO action would likely embarrass China, rather than ac-
knowledging and applauding the great strides it has already made.130 
Such action would set China up for more criticism from other countries 
and possibly alienate it.131 Consequently, other developing countries 
would be deterred from changing their own laws to conform to IPR 
norms. As any grade school teacher knows, ambiguously defined rules 
lead to disorder in the classroom. Students who fully understood the rea-
sons behind the rules their teachers impose and who have a say in the 
                                                                                                             
 125. A harmonization mechanism would provide a basic structure to which each mem-
ber state must conform its rules. GEORGE A. BERMANN & ROGER J. GOEBEL ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 536–39 (West Group 2002) (1993). 
 126. See infra Part III. 
 127. Yu, supra note 3, at 151–52. 
 128. Because the WTO is a neutral body with a peaceful mission to promote fair trade, 
it is capable of promoting resolutions to these problems. Id. The United States needs to 
find a peaceful solution to the IPR problems, rather than imposing sanctions or a WTO 
hearing because it relies upon China to keep peace in North Korea and Russia, to fight 
terrorism in the Middle East and around the world, and for trade; the United States cannot 
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rulemaking, however, are more apt to abide by them.132 Analogously, 
China and other similarly situated countries must be held to clear stan-
dards. Like students in a classroom, each would benefit from a clear 
enunciation of these expectations in the TRIPS Agreement itself, rather 
than in subsequent documents produced by the IIPA and USTR to criti-
cize China. Although China has worked to implement criminal laws to 
protect IPR, it cannot be expected to meet the stringent expectations of 
the United States and organizations like the IIPA when those expecta-
tions are expressed ambiguously in TRIPS, the defining document. 
Although they did not foresee the specific problems affecting China 
today, the drafters of TRIPS did anticipate that with continued growth in 
technology, globalization, and potentially unanswered questions in the 
agreement itself, there would be an eventual need to amend the Agree-
ment.133 As a result, Article 71 was adopted to provide a mechanism to 
review and amend TRIPS. Specifically, it calls for TRIPS to be reviewed 
at least every other year or at any time therein that the Council decides 
“in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant 
modification or amendment of [the TRIPS] Agreement.”134 It is pivotal 
that Article 71 powers be used to tweak the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement to ensure the high quality of Member States’ legal systems 
and to adequately stop IPR infringement and punish pirates while main-
taining due process.135 Through this process, member nations must—at a 
minimum—amend provisions to make the agreement self-executing, re-
vise Article 41’s ambiguities, and ensure that adequate resources are 
available to enforce TRIPS. 
Member States must assess, via the mechanisms available in Article 
71,136 how the provisions of Article 41 can be fine-tuned to ensure every 
member’s concerns are met. The current ambiguities, as explained in 
Parts II and III, render it nearly impossible for Member States to imple-
ment measures to successfully protect IPR. Likewise, it is pertinent that 
China and other countries, in the process of changing their own systems, 
are key players in this negotiation process. By taking ownership and re-
sponsibility, China’s government and citizens will gain a greater under-
standing of the rules by which they will abide and negotiators can be cer-
tain that the measures agreed upon are both practicable and just. 
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Further, the TRIPS Agreement must be re-evaluated and amended to 
be a self-executing agreement. This would mean that a Member State 
could rely on the Agreement alone to set national standards and laws in 
order to ensure IPR are protected, rather than requiring Member States or 
non-government organizations to make their own pacts with infringing 
states. For example, instead of relying upon independent agreements 
such as the one made in July 2005 between the Motion Picture Associa-
tion (MPA), an international organization designed to protect American 
films,137 and China, TRIPS itself should provide similarly specific 
mechanisms to curb piracy. The MPA-China agreement, for example, 
stipulated that the MPA will regularly submit a list of films which will be 
screened there in exchange for an agreement that Chinese officials would 
seize all illegal copies of the listed movies found on the streets.138 Al-
though this agreement has resulted in a dramatic decrease in the avail-
ability of pirated DVDs in China—for example, none of the films listed 
on the first submission list were available in Shanghai139—it would be 
more efficient if specific legal language was included in TRIPS which 
could be applied to all Member States, rather than forcing the motion 
picture industry to create separate agreements with infringing nations. 
Finally, using its Article 71 power of review, the Council must initiate 
the negotiation of a mechanism to provide supplemental resources to 
states for the enforcement of TRIPS.140 For example, Member States 
could require that parties wishing to pursue an action in court pay a fee to 
access the court. This court fee would prevent Member States from using 
their lack of resources as an excuse for failing to prosecute IPR in-
fringements.141 A second option would be to require Member States to 
pay dues to the WTO. Like the United Nations, the WTO is a treaty-
based organization and does not have its own revenue sources to keep it 
afloat.142 Membership dues—paid on a sliding scale—allow the U.N. to 
pursue its mission.143 Similarly, membership dues could enable the WTO 
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to distribute resources on an as-needed basis to countries without ample 
resources to implement IPR protection mechanisms.144 By amending 
TRIPS to include a provision that would provide developing countries 
with the extra resources they need to protect IPR, the loopholes invited 
by Article 41 and which allow Member States to only enforce IPR to the 
extent they have the resources to do so, would be narrowed.145 
V. CONCLUSION: ‘HOLLYWOOD’ STRIKES BACK 
A. Introduction 
Although the MPAA and Hollywood executives are encouraged by the 
idea that China has conducted a few investigations into and raids of 
fraudulent businesses, the rest of the world nevertheless looks on con-
fused and disgruntled at the slow pace with which change is occurring in 
China.146 But perhaps “Hollywood” has the right view—that China is 
forging new paths and is coming around to protect IPR, albeit slowly. As 
China has begun to recognize the influence of piracy on its own movie 
industry, its government has been more apt to acknowledge the idea that 
IPR protections are important. As a result, China has become more will-
ing to work with the United States and the WTO to enforce IPR to the 
extent it can. But Hollywood—and now the U.S. government—have rec-
ognized that complacency is not an option; they must still take the initia-
tive to protect themselves because TRIPS is not currently strong enough 
to do it.147 
B. Current Efforts to Protect U.S. Business Interests 
Although some Hollywood experts might be optimistic about China’s 
progress, none can be accused of naiveté. Hollywood executives, the 
MPAA, and other organizations have taken their own initiatives to curb 
the impact of copyright piracy in China.  For example, the MPAA re-
cently filed lawsuits against six hubs for TV show trading because inter-
national markets are hurt by reduced demand for syndication and interna-
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tional sales when content is stolen.148 In addition, some movie production 
companies have asked that movie theater representatives wear night vi-
sion goggles during the first weeks of a movie’s release in order to effec-
tively patrol for pirates.149 And at the Spiderman premiere, security was 
tighter than the named superhero’s own webs around arch-enemy the 
Green Goblin. The studio sent the footage to the theater locked in vaults 
and armed with digital tracking codes, and guests were sent through 
metal detectors and subject to identification checks in order to prevent 
illegal recordings of the movie from being made.150 
On an international front, movie production companies, such as War-
ner Brothers, have experimented with the simultaneous release of movies 
in theaters in the United States and on video in China. For example, the 
movie Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants, produced by Warner Brothers, 
was released in 1,500 stores in China on the same day it was released in 
American theaters.151 A Warner Brothers executive described this as “a 
way to offer movie buffs legal alternatives to stolen copies.”152 However, 
the studio in this case never planned to release this movie in Chinese 
theaters, so it is unclear what impact such a strategy would have on box 
office sales for movies that are planned for future release in China.153 
Another creative approach was taken by the MPA, which sponsored a 
merit badge for Boy Scouts in Hong Kong who took a course on interna-
tional property rights and piracy.154 Even actor Jackie Chan and Califor-
nia Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, a former actor himself, irate at 
lost revenues after their movies’ DVD release, have teamed up to fight 
piracy as real-life action heroes in a new public service announcement 
aimed at educating China’s citizens about the criminality of piracy.155 
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These creative attempts by the U.S. government and businesses at pro-
tecting IPR serve to compliment the efforts by the Chinese government 
and other international governments to educate people in China about the 
importance of protecting IPR and even about the existence of IPR. How-
ever, that these actions are even necessary is a clear signal to the interna-
tional community that the current standards in TRIPS are not working 
and must be changed if they are to work independently from outside 
agreements and intervention to protect intellectual property rights. 
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